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Abstract
We discuss the feasibility of using the detection of electron antineutrinos produced in
fission to monitor the time dependence of the plutonium content of nuclear power reactors.
If practical such a scheme would allow world-wide, automated monitoring of reactors and,
thereby, the detection of certain proliferation scenarios. For GWe power reactors the count
rates and the sensitivity of the antineutrino spectrum (to the core burn-up) suggest that
monitoring of the gross operational status of the reactor from outside the containment vessel
is feasible. As the plutonium content builds up in a given burn cycle the total number of
antineutrinos steadily drops and this variation is quite detectable, assuming fixed reactor
power. The average antineutrino energy also steadily drops, and a measurement of this vari-
ation would be very useful to help off set uncertainties in the total reactor power. However,
the expected change in the antineutrino signal from the diversion of a significant quantity
(SQ) of plutonium, which would typically require the diversion of as little as a single fuel
assemblies in a GWe reactor, would be very difficult to detect.
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1 Background
It is widely reported that India obtained its weapons-grade plutonium by running its un-
safeguarded CANDU reactors to produce Pu [1]–[3]. Prevention of the illicit production
of Pu in most countries is through the imposition of an intrusive inspection regime by
the International Atomic Energy Agency. This approach has proven to be quite resource
intensive. More preferable would be a method to monitor continually the nuclear fuel content
of reactors, thus ensuring that weapons material is not being diverted. Ideally, one wants to
do this not only continuously, but also cheaply, unobtrusively, and with minimal manpower.
Related (but somewhat independent) concerns are the difficulty of determining the iso-
topic fuel content, for attribution, of a rogue nuclear device and the difficulty of detecting a
small nuclear explosion of order 1 kton. Such a small explosion, done underground, can be
concealed because of the lack of any definitive signal; for example, microseisems would mask
any acoustic signature.
For all these problems electron antineutrino1 detection in principle offers a solution. The
feasibility of using antineutrino detection has been examined in the past. In fact, the original
reactor experiment which discovered the antineutrino (by Fred Reines and Clyde Cowan)
was done at a reactor only after a first idea had been considered, to detect antineutrinos
from a nuclear explosion at the Nevada Test Site [4]-[6].
Indeed, the technologies developed for particle physics experiments that use large neutrino
detectors have added further interest in such a solution. For example, in recent times large
water- [7]-[10], ice- [11]-[13], and mineral-oil-based [14, 15] neutrino detectors have become
practical and relatively efficient. In fact, Supernova 1987A was seen by the Kamiokande
detector in Japan [16] and the IMB detector in the USA [17]. Each detecting about 10
events, as shown together in Ref. [18].
There have been large and significant experiments on the antineutrino spectra from re-
1The term “neutrino” is often generically used to describe both neutrinos and their antiparticle antineu-
trinos, especially with respect to a “neutrino detector.” We will do the same for a detector or beam, but
will try to make the distinction clear for particle processes.
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actors [19, 20]. Also a well-known, ongoing neutrino oscillation experiment detects reactors
from distances on the order of 100 km [21]. The idea of using a mobile nuclear submarine to
do a similar experiment has been discussed [22] and the detection of radioactive antineutrinos
from the Earth’s core is now feasible [23].
Further, at present there already is an ongoing experimental study [24] on the feasibility
of building an antineutrino detector for reactor monitoring, a subject with its own history
[25, 26]. The aim is to determine the class of safeguards problems that might be addressed.
In this paper we examine some of the theoretical issues involved in trying to monitor reactor
core fuel with antineutrinos.
2 Physics motivation
When a nucleus undergoes fission the unstable fission products pre-dominantly beta-decay,
thus emitting antineutrinos. Fission processes mostly emit antineutrinos (as opposed to
neutrinos) because the vast majority of the beta decays are from neutron rich nuclei where
the underlying process is the conversion of a neutron into a proton, electron, and antineutrino:
n→ p+ e− + ν¯e. (1)
On average, about 5 antineutrinos are emitted per fission. These antineutrinos are not
emitted instantaneously because of the finite life-time of the fission products. However, the
fact that reactor monitoring is a steady-state measurement means that time variation is not
an issue. The energy spectrum of the antineutrinos ranges from zero to about 15 MeV, with
an average energy of about 3 MeV. Only a very small fraction of the antineutrinos emitted
have energies above 8 MeV. As an example, in Figure 1 we show the relative energy spectra
of the antineutrinos from the fission of 235U and 239Pu.
This and the other fission spectra used in this paper were calculated assuming thermal
neutron induced fission for 235U, 239,241Pu and fast neutron induced fission for 238U. To obtain
these results we used the England and Rider [27] evaluated cumulative fission product yields
and the beta decay branching ratios and end-point energies from ENDF/B-VI [28].
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Figure 1: The relative energy spectra of the antineutrinos from the fission of 235U (dashed
line) and 239Pu (solid line).
The cumulative spectrum for a given nuclide involves contributions from thousands of
beta decays, each associated with an unique end point energy. This cumulative spectrum is
given by
N(Eν¯) =
∑
i
Yi(A,Z)
∑
i,j
Bi,j(E
j
0)R(Eν¯ , E
j
0, Z), (2)
where the Yi(A,Z) are the fission product cumulative yields, Bi,j are the j branching fractions
for the decays of nucleus (A,Z) with end-point energies Ej0, each described by an individual
beta decay spectrum R(Eν¯ , E
j
0, Z).
The differences in the fission products produced in the differing fissioning systems leads
to a significant difference in the magnitude and shape of the respective antineutrino spectra.
These differences, and the fact that the emitted antineutrinos cannot be shielded, are key to
the concept of monitoring the core fuel.
Antineutrino detection occurs mainly through the antineutrino-proton charge-current
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reaction2
ν¯e + p→ e
+ + n. (4)
The threshold for this reaction is 1.8 MeV and the cross section at the mean fission an-
tineutrino energy is about 10−42 cm2. When folded with the energy-dependent detection
cross section (4) the detected antineutrino spectrum peaks at about 3.8 MeV. Because the
interaction of neutrinos with matter is so extremely weak, the detector sizes that would be
needed for projects of the type we are considering need to be either very large or able to
have long measurement times, or both.3
3 The principles of antineutrino monitoring
We now turn to the feasibility of detecting the antineutrinos produced in fission to monitor
fuel content of a functioning nuclear reactor [31], from outside the containment building.
There are several classes of power reactors that need to be considered [32, 33]. But in the
present work we restrict our discussion to a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) similar to the
San Onofrie4 3.4 GWt reactor in California, where antineutrino monitoring is presently being
studied[24] (see below). We examine the predicted time-dependent antineutrino spectra for
a 2.7% enriched PWR reactor. To test the sensitivity of the expected signals to the initial
uranium enrichment we also examine a 4.2% enriched PWR.
A 3.4 GWt power reactor emits about 10
26 antineutrinos per day. The absolute magnitude
of the detected antineutrino spectrum differs for each of the actinides contributing to the
total fission rate. So, the total number of antineutrinos detected changes with the relative
2Contrariwise, neutrino detection is mainly via the opposite reaction,
νe + n→ p+ e
−. (3)
since neutrinos tend to result from a fusion process, such as in the Sun.
3Antineutrinos can also interact with the electrons in the detector via antineutrino-electron scattering.
But the event rate is orders of magnitude smaller [29], essentially because the mass factor in the cross-section
equation is that of the electron [30].
4Throughout this paper we distinguish the thermal from the electric power of a reactor using the subscripts
t and e, respectively. For example, GWt refers to a GW of thermal power, while GWe refers to a GW of
electric power. Typically, GWe ≈ 0.3 GWt.
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fissioning fraction of the these isotopes in the reactor core. Thus, for a fixed reactor power,
the number of detected antineutrinos is a reflection of the core burn-up.
The shape of the spectrum is also a measure of the core burn-up. As shown in Figure
2, the cumulative number of antineutrinos (when folded over the detection cross section) as
a function of antineutrino energy is different for each species. By comparing the number of
antineutrinos with energies up to 3 MeV with the number up to 6 MeV, pure 235U and 239Pu
are easily distinguishable.
The variation in the number of antineutrinos emitted with burn-up could be masked
by uncertainties in the total thermal reactor power (total fission rate). Thus, if feasible, a
measurement of the time-dependent shape of the spectrum or of the average antineutrino
energy would provide an important independent variable for monitoring the reactor core.
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Figure 2: The integrated fission antineutrino spectra up to energy Eν
A type of detector that could be used would be a portable version of the mineral-oil based
liquid scintillator used in, for example, the 100 ton LSND neutrino oscillation experiment
[14] and the follow-up MiniBooNE experiment [15]. The Sandia/Livermore collaboration [24]
is currently testing a prototype neutrino detector of this type. For a 1 cubic meter liquid
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scintillator detector situated 24 m from the core of a 3.4 GWt reactor, Bernstein et al. [24]
expect a healthy signal of 2740 antineutrino events per day.
The questions that we attempt to address here are:
• What are the expected isotopic contributions to the fission rate as a function of time?
• what are the corresponding antineutrino spectra and how well do they reflect the fuel
burn-up?
• what are the expected changes in the antineutrino spectra for different fuel diversion
scenarios?
• and what detection accuracy is required to safeguard against these?
To address these questions we examined a 2.7% and a 4.2% enriched uranium PWR. The
2.7% PWR corresponds to a 3 year discharge neutron exposure of 30 GW days per metric
ton of uranium (GWd/MTU), whereas, the 4.2% enriched fuel corresponds to a neutron
exposure of twice that in its lifetime. The temporal results were taken from earlier coupled
calculations with the ERPI/CELL and CINDER-2 codes [34, 35].
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Figure 3: The change in fuel composition with time of four isotopes in a 2.7% and 4.2%
pressurized light water reactor.
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In Figure 3 we show the fission history for the 2.7% enriched (97.3% 238U, 2.7% 235U)
and the 4.2% enriched (95.8% 238U, 4.2% 235U) reactors. As can be seen, the percentage of
the total fission from 235U steadily drops as a function of time while that from 239Pu steadily
increases. Apart from the factor of two difference in the exposure times, the fission histories
for the two different enrichments are very similar.
The results of all our other calculations for the antineutrino spectra for the two different
fuel enrichments are also very similar. Therefore, for the remainder of this paper we will show
only those results obtained for the 2.7% enriched case. So, for example, our conclusions on
antineutrino monitoring apply equally well to the 4.2% enriched fuel, with the understanding
that exposure times should be approximately doubled.
After about 3 years burning (30 GWd/MTU) the fuel has an actinide isotopic composition
of (95% 238U, 1% 235U, 1% 239Pu, 3% heavier actinides including 240,241Pu), with the fission
fuel contributing to the total fraction of fissions as shown in Fig. 3.
As the 239Pu accumulates in the reactor, it also captures neutrons to produce 240Pu, which
in turn captures neutrons to produce 241Pu. The optimum time for clandestine extraction
would therefore depend on the plutonium isotopic ratios desired. The maximum plutonium
content is after 3 years exposure. However, 240Pu has some undesirable nuclear properties
from a weapons point of view, and better grade plutonium is obtained by removing the
plutonium before a cycle is completed. Over the fuel life-time the steady increase in the
fission fraction from 239Pu translates into a steady decease in the number of antineutrinos
emitted and in the average antineutrino energy, Fig 4. The spectrum of emitted antineutrinos
by fissioning 241Pu does not differ significantly from 235U. Thus, after about 1.5 years the
number of antineutrino emitted begins to level off as the 241Pu starts to build up.
4 Monitoring fuel content of a running reactor
The situation described in Fig 4 is for fresh enriched uranium irradiated over a three year
period. This differs from the actual situation for a normal PWR burning in equilibrium,
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Figure 4: The expected change in the number of antineutrino events and the average an-
tineutrino energy as a function of time. The drop in the number of antineutrino events
occurs because, as the fuel burns, the fraction of fissions from 239Pu and the number of
antineutrinos emitted from 239Pu is lower than for 235U. As 241Pu grows in the number of
events levels off.
where the fuel is cycled annually. A large pressurized light water reactor has about 240 fuel
assemblies, of which 80 are replaced at the end of each cycle, and the assemblies are then
shuffled in their location. When the reactor is running in equilibrium at the beginning of
each fuel cycle, one third of the fuel is fresh enriched uranium, one-third has been irradiated
for one cycle and one-third for two cycles. At the end of the cycle one-third of the fuel
has been irradiated for three cycles and is removed and replaced with fresh fuel. Each fuel
assembly typically contains one-half ton of fuel. Therefore, in three years about 5 kg of
plutonium will be produced in each assembly of normal fuel.
As the reactor operates in equilibrium, from the beginning of a cycle to the end of a
cycle. the change in the antineutrino spectrum is a steady (but less steep) drop in the
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number of antineutrinos emitted as the 239Pu builds up. For a 2.7% enriched uranium PWR
the drop in the number of antineutrinos is about 5% in one cycle. When the discharged fuel
is replaced with fresh fuel, the antineutrino event rate jumps to its ‘start of cycle’ value.
However, it is important to note that monitoring the reactor core fuel burn-up through the
time-dependent change in the antineutrino spectrum requires independent knowledge of the
reactor power. Otherwise the expected 5% change in the antineutrino spectrum might be
masked by unrecorded fluctuations in the total power.
Typical diversion scenarios would likely involve the diversion of an entire fuel assembly
and replacement with fresh fuel. In principle, a single assembly would contain enough pluto-
nium to make a nuclear weapon. An unannounced removal of 1-2 additional fuel assemblies
at the same time that other scheduled work was being carried out would require an accuracy
in the antineutrino detection rate of better than 1%. The detection of this type of change
would be a much more difficult task than observing the 5% change in the magnitude of the
spectrum over one fuel cycle.
In Fig. 5 we compare the expected time-dependent antineutrino count rate under normal
operation of a 2.7% PWR with that expected for a significant fuel diversion. In this latter
case we have assumed that an additional unannounced 10% of the fuel was replaced during a
scheduled fuel cycle management. The solid curve shows the relative change in the number
of events on normal fuel management, i.e., at the end of the fuel cycle the discharged fuel
is removed and at the start of the next cycle the core consists of 1/3 fresh 2.7% uranium
fuel, 1/3 fuel irradiated for 1 cycle, and 1/3 irradiated for 2 cycles. The dotted curve shows
a realistic and significant violation of their safeguards obligations in which an additional
unreported 10% of the 2 cycle-irradiated fuel has been replace with fresh fuel. In this case
the start of the new cycle involves a core with 37% fresh 2.7% enriched uranium, 33% 1 cycle
irradiated fuel, and 30% 2 cycle irradiated fuel. We note, that the typical shutdown time of
1 month during fuel management is not included in Fig. 5.
In contrast to the above 10% diversion of the fuel scenario, gross diversions of fuel or
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Figure 5: When burning in equilibrium the number of antineutrino events drops about 5%
from the beginning to the end of a normal fuel cycle in a PWR (solid line). . A diversion
of an additional 10% of the fuel (more than a critical mass of Pu) leads to a small change
in the number of antineutrinos emitted (dotted line). The gross misuse of the reactor by
the replacement of an addition 1/3 of the irradiated fuel with fresh fuel during fuel-cycle
management (long-dashed curve) would lead to an observable change in the antineutrino
spectrum.
gross deviations in the reactor operation from that announced would likely lead to quite
detectable changes from the expected antineutrino spectrum. The long-dashed curve in Fig.
5 represents the expected number of antineutrino in the case that 2/3 (as opposed to the
regular 1/3) of the irradiated fuel is replaced at the end of a cycle. In this scenario, at the start
of the new cycle the core would consist of 2/3 fresh 2.7% uranium and 1/3 1 cycle irradiated
fuel. This gross misuse of the reactor would lead to a 10% shift in the antineutrino count
rate, to be compared with the 5% change expected under normal fuel-cycle management.
All the calculations presented above for the expected changes in antineutrino spectra
assume that our reactor burn-up and antineutrino spectra calculations assume no uncertain-
ties. This, of course, is not the case. Uncertainties in the calculated inventories of the four
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important fissioning materials (235,238U, 239,241Pu) compared with the inventories measured
[35] for a range of fuels indicate that these inventory calculations are accurate to better than
a few percent.
However, the inventories of total core radionuclides is of limited extent and the uncertain-
ties large. This precludes a determination of the uncertainties on inventories of the important
fission products that contribute to the aggregate beta and antineutrino spectrum. For these,
inventories calculated by CINDER and ORIGEN can deviate by more than 10% in several
cases. The accuracy with which reactor core burn-up and the corresponding antineutrino
spectrum can be monitored is best determined by a comparison between calculated expec-
tations and experimental observations of the time-dependent change antineutrino spectrum
for a known reactor.
The ongoing work at the San Onofrie reactor [24] could provide ideal data for a com-
parison between theory and experiment. However, even though large reactor detectors for
neutrino oscillation experiments, such as CHOOZ [19], have measured the energy depen-
dence of the antineutrino spectrum quite well, small detectors of the San Onofrie size (∼ 1
m3) will be unlikely to provide the desired information on the antineutrino spectral shape.
Since, as discussed, the difference in the detected antineutrino energy spectral shape for 235U
and 239Pu is quite significant, such information would be very important in monitoring the
fuel content of a reactor.
For smaller reactors (∼ 10 MW) a greater fraction of the fuel would need to be diverted
at one time. In assessing the feasibility of using antineutrino detection for such reactors
there is a trade off between the smaller number of fissions per day (and hence the number
of detectable antineutrinos) and the larger change in the spectrum. Antineutrino detection
also presents itself as a possibly useful means of monitoring hot spent fuel [36].
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5 conclusions
Antineutrino monitoring of reactors can provide unique information on the burn-up in the
core from outside the containment vessel. If accurate knowledge of the reactor power is
known through an independent measurement, the variation of the number of detected an-
tineutrino events reflects the build-up of plutonium. Thus, antineutrino monitoring could
be used to detect gross deviations from the declared operational mode of a reactor. A mea-
surement of the average anti-neutrino energy or of the shape of the spectrum would provide
valuable additional information and would greatly reduce uncertainties in relating the an-
tineutrino spectrum to core burn-up. However, the magnitude of the expected change in
the antineutrino count rate of less than 1% in the case of the diversion of a critical mass of
plutonium suggests that antineutrino monitoring is unlikely to be sensitive to this class of
safeguards.
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